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Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is an honour and a privilege to be invited to take part in this symposium, commemorating
the 50th anniversary of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict. All too often the destruction of cultural property is overshadowed by other human
horrors of conflicts.

These cultural monuments, however, represent a common and irreplaceable

heritage of all humankind.

They serve as a defining link between us and our ancestry, and are

essential to our identity. The 1954 Convention, by stating strongly that international law will strive
to safeguard this heritage, was a milestone step towards the creation of an international order where
our cultural patrimony is protected from wanton destruction.

To be effective, the protections established by the Convention need, of course, to be
enforced vigorously by national and international courts. The norms enunciated by the Convention,
moreover, can inform our understanding

of other international legal instruments which offer

protection to cultural property in the event of armed conflicts.

I am therefore grateful for the

invitation to speak before you about the protection of the cultural property in the jurisprudence
my own court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
I

of

As most of you know, my Tribunal was established by the Security Council pursuant to its
Chapter VII authority to enact measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
stability. The Tribunal's mandate is to try individuals responsible for the violations of international
humanitarian law and the international laws or customs of war committed during the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s. The Statute under which the Tribunal operates, and
which both vests us with jurisdiction and provides a substantive definition of offences we must
punish, was thus enacted by the Security Council. In carrying out our judicial function, we must
also ensure that the offences we try were prohibited by customary international law at the time of
their commission.

In these remarks, I will first outline the normative framework provided for the protection of
cultural property by the provisions of our Statute. I will then examine in detail the relevant cases
decided by the Tribunal which dealt with the destruction of cultural property and the appropriate
punishment under international law. Finally, I will comment briefly on the indictments confirmed
by the Tribunal where destruction of cultural property was pleaded by the Prosecution.

I would not

be able to offer detailed comments on these cases because they have not yet been decided. But the
list of issues presented in these indictments will give a sense of how the jurisprudence

of the

Yugoslavia Tribunal on the protection of cultural property may evolve, and of the degree of
protection that may be afforded to cultural property in future cases.

The most important provision in the Statute of the Tribunal relating to the protection of
cultural property is Article 3, Section D. Article 3 in general prohibits violations of the laws and
customs of war. This Article requires that the acts prohibited under it be closely related to an armed
conflict.

I

In elaborating this requirement, the Appeals Chamber of our Tribunal has explained that

"[w]hat ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war crime is

I See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
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shaped by or dependent upon the environment-the

armed conflict-in

which it is committed ....

The armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence of
an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator's

ability to

commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for
which it was committed.,,2

This requirement needs to be compared with the requirement of Article

18.1 of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property.

Article 18.1 states, in relevant part,

that the Convention "shall apply in the event of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties."

While Article 18.1 in terms

applies only to international armed conflicts, Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute has been interpreted
in the Tribunal's case-law to apply to both international and national armed conflicts.3

This interpretation parallels Article 19.1 of the Convention, which states that, "[i]n the event
of an armed conflict not on an international character occurring within the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property."

It is important

to note, of course, that the Convention, from its inception, intended for some of its measures to
apply in times of peace, in order to provide a more robust protection of cultural property in wartime.
These measures were recently strengthened by the adoption of the 1991 Additional Protocol, which
insists on the need to take preparatory measures in peacetime to protect cultural property in times of
war.

Section D of Article3 of our Statute states that the offences prohibited under it as violations
of the laws or customs of war shall include "seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 2002, para. 58..
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2
October 1995, para. 137.
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and works of art and science."

Section D also states that this list is not necessarily an exhaustive

one.

As many of you may have recognized, this statutory provision reproduces the core of
Articles 27 and 56 of the Hague Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.
The Hague Convention, of course, did not refer in terms to the notion of cultural property among
the protections it established as a part of the intemationallaw
Article 3 of our Tribunal's

of war. But that does not mean that

Statute cannot be regarded as a source of protection for cultural property

in the event of an armed conflict. A comparison between the text of the article which I just quoted
and Article 1 of the 1954 Convention shows that Article 3, Section D of our Statute covers a
significant part of what has come to be considered as cultural property.

Article 3, Section D

therefore allows our Tribunal to try and punish the destruction of this property as a war crime.

Let me also draw your attention to another provision in our Statute, Article 2, which vests
the Tribunal with authority to punish violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Section D of
that Article prohibits "extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."

The text of this Article would suggest that it

may, in appropriate cases, serve as another statutory source of protection of cultural property.

The

practice of our Tribunal, to which I will tum in a moment, has been to use Article 3, Section D as
the statutory provision under which to punish destruction of cultural property. None of the cases
decided so far have done so under Section D of Article 2. The reason for this practice is likely twofold. First, Article 3, Section D is a more specific provision that Article 2, Section D, because it
expressly described the kind of property whose destruction is punishable under our Statute. This
property is described as "institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education," and to "the arts;"
the provision also punishes destruction of "historical monuments and works of art." Section D of
Article 2, by contrast, refers only to "property," and provides no elaboration of the term. Second, as
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I already explained, under the jurisprudence

of the Tribunal, Article 3, which concerns violations of

laws or customs of war, applies both to international and internal armed conflict. By contrast,
Article 2, which relates only to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, applies only to
armed conflicts of international character.

Given the nature of the armed conflict in the former

Yugoslavia, which had both international and internal elements, Article 3 covers a broader swath of
conduct than Article 2. The preference exhibited by the Trial Chambers of our Tribunal for Article
3 may, therefore, be viewed as a welcome development from the standpoint of safeguarding cultural
property, because it affords that property a higher degree of protection.

In addition, Article 5 of the Tribunal's

Statute authorizes the Tribunal to punish, as crimes

against humanity, a range of offences committed against civilian population in the course of an
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character.

The case-law of the Tribunal has

explained that to be prohibited by this provision of the Statute, the proscribed act must form a part
of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population, and the perpetrator must know
about the attack as well as about the fact that his acts form a part of the attack." Section (H) of
Article 5 provides that these punishable offences shall include "persecutions
religious grounds."

on political, racial and

While this provision does not mention cultural property (nor even property in

general), as I will demonstrate shortly, it has been used by Trial Chambers of the Tribunal to hold
individuals who committed destruction of cultural property responsible for their acts. As I will also
explain, this jurisprudence

of our Tribunal may offer a way of strengthening the applicability of the

Convention not only in times of war but also in peacetime.

Let me now tum to the case-law of the Tribunal which has applied and elaborated these
statutory norms. There are six cases decided by the Tribunal in which the destruction of cultural
property was at issue. Four of these cases were decided after a trial, while two were a result of

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 223; see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 2002, paras 85, 96, 102.
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guilty pleas entered by the defendants.

I will discuss these cases in the chronological order in

which they were decided, in order to give you a sense of the development of the Tribunal's
jurisprudence

on the protection of cultural property.

I begin with the decision in the case ofTihomir

Blaskic, a Croatian general convicted in

March 2000, for offences which included violations of law and customs of war under Article 3 of
our Statute.' Among these violations was a conviction for the destruction of institutions dedicated
to religion or education in 12 towns and villages located in the Lasva Valley in the central part of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In rendering the conviction for this offence, the Trial Chamber specified

that, to be punishable under Article 3, Section D, "[t]he damage of destruction must have been
committed intentionally to institutions which may clearly be identified as dedicated to religion or
education and which were not being used for military purposes at the time of the acts.,,6 The Trial
Chamber also stated that, to constitute violations of international laws or customs of war, "the
institutions must not have been in the immediate vicinity of military objectives.?"

The Trial

Chamber did not explain the rationale for this limiting requirement, but one can speculate that it
might have been a concern about the difficulty of determining when the religious or educational
institutions located in the immediate vicinity of military action served no military purpose, or
whether the damage caused to these institutions could be seen as legitimate collateral damage.

Perhaps more interestingly, General Blaskic was also convicted for persecution as a crime
against humanity.

This conviction was premised, among other things, on his participation in the

destruction or wilful damage of "institutions dedicated to religion or education."

The Trial

Chamber concluded that the destruction of such institutions can provide support for a charge that
the defendant intended to persecute on the statutorily enumerated grounds, such as those of race,
religion or politics. The Chamber stated that "persecution may take forms other than injury to the

5

The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000.

6

Ibid., para. 185.
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human person, in particular those acts rendered serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the
discrimination

they seek to instil within humankind.

[P]ersecution may thus take the form of

confiscation or destruction of private dwellings or businesses, symbolic buildings or means of
subsistence belonging to the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina"

The Trial Chamber

reference, in the passage just quoted, to "symbolic buildings" makes clear that it viewed the
intentional destruction of religious (and perhaps other cultural) institutions, when committed with a
prohibited discriminatory intent, as an act directed, in the [mal analysis, at the individual to whom
these objects of patrimony exemplified his own religion or culture. As such, the wanton destruction
of these institutions was punishable not only by virtue of the specific prohibition in Article 3 of the
Statute, but also as an indirect persecution of the individuals who associated with these institutions
on the grounds of religion, race or politics.

The destruction of property has been in this way

equated to the injury to human beings. I must note that the judgment in this case is under appeal.

The next decision on which I would like to focus is the judgment, rendered in February
2001, against Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez." The defendants were, respectively, a political and a
military leader of the Croatian Defence Council, an organization responsible for military operations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993. Both defendants were convicted, among other crimes, for the
war crime of destroying or wilfully damaging institutions dedicated to religion or education.

This

was a conviction under Article 3, Section D of the Statute. The Trial Chamber found that Kordic
and Cerkez deliberately targeted Muslim mosques and other religious and cultural institutions in the
course of the military campaign.

The relevant analysis of the Trial Chamber was much more detailed that that of the Trial
Chamber in Blaskic. The Trial Chamber expressly noted that the former Yugoslavia ratified the
1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 1956, and that the Convention continued
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Ibid.
Ibid., para. 227.
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to apply to both the Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
declarations of independence.

10

after their

The Trial Chamber then surveyed the types of cultural property

protected under Article 1 of the Convention, such as "'movable

or immovable property of great

importance to the cultural heritage of every people,' 'buildings whose main and effective purpose is
to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property,' and 'centres containing a large amount of
cultural property.

",11

The Trial Chamber then concluded, applying this definition to the case before

it, that "educational institutions are undoubtedly immovable property of great importance to the
cultural heritage of peoples in that they are without exception centres of learning, arts, and sciences,
with their valuable collections of books and works of arts and sciences.v'"

The Trial Chamber also

clarified the scope of Section D of Article 3. The Chamber noted that the offence of destroying
religious or education institutions overlaps to a certain extent with the offence of unlawfully
attacking civilian objects in general. In commenting on this overlap, the Trial Chamber observed
that the offence with which Article 3, Section D is concerned has a more specific scope, because it
is concerned solely with acts directed against "cultural heritage.t'':'

Also of interest is the Trial Chamber's rejection of the argument, put forward by the
Defence, that the special protection provided by the 1954 Convention applied only to property
registered under the International Register of Cultural Property.

The Defence argued that in the

absence of such registration, religious or educational institutions receive only ordinary protection
and therefore could be destroyed or damaged in cases of military necessity regardless of whether
they were occupied or used for military purposes.

14

The Trial Chamber responded by observing

that special protection under Article 8(1) of the 1954 Convention was a special measure provided
for '''a limited number of refuges intended to shelter movable cultural property,'"

Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T,
Ibid., para. 359.
II Ibid. (quoting Article 1 of the 1954 Convention
Conflict).
12 Ibid., para. 360.
13 Ibid., para. 361.
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Judgement,

and that "this

26 February 2001.

10

for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed

8

special protection would be lost if the refuges were used for military purposes.':"

The Trial

Chamber concluded from this that there was "little difference between the conditions for the
according of general protection and those for the provision of special protection.,,16 Consequently,
the fundamental principle, in the Trial Chamber's view, was that "protection of whatever type will
be lost if cultural property, including educational institutions, is used for military purpose," a
principle which the Trial Chamber found consistent with the custom codified in Article 27 of the
Hague Regulations.

I?

In addition to the conviction under Article 3, the Trial Chamber convicted both defendants
for persecution as a crime against humanity.

The rationale was similar to that adopted by the Trial

Chamber in Blaskic, but considerably more developed.

The Kordic and Cerkez Chamber noted that

the case-law of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 1991 Report of the International Law Commission
have singled out the destruction of religious buildings as "a clear case of persecution as a crime
against humanity.I'i''

The Trial Chamber commented that this destruction, "when perpetrated with

the requisite discriminatory intent, amounts to an attack on the very religious identity of a people.
As such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of 'crimes against humanity,' for all of
humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious culture and its concomitant
cultural objects.,,19

The next case where the accused was convicted for the destruction of cultural property
under Article 3, Section D, is the case of the former Serbian President Biljana Plavsic, which was
decided in February 2003_2o Plavsic was convicted for persecution as a crime against humanity, and

See ibid., para. 357.
Ibid., para. 36l.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., para. 206 (citing Nuremberg Judgement, pp. 248, 302; 1991 ILC Report, p. 268 (persecution may take the form
of the "systematic destruction of monuments or buildings representative of a particular social, religious, cultural or
other group")).
19 Ibid., para. 207.
20 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, IT-00-39&40/1, Sentencing Judgement, 27 February 2003.
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this conviction was based, among other things, on the destruction of several cultural monuments
and religious sites in the Foca, Visegrad and Zvornik municipalities.

The Trial Chamber

emphasized that these monuments, some of which dated from the Middle Ages, were "culturally,
historically and regionally significant sites," and described one of the them, the Alidza mosque in
Foca, as a "pearl amongst the cultural heritage in th[e Balkan] part of Europe.,,21 Because the
conviction was based on the defendant's

guilty plea, however, the Trial Chamber's judgment did

not contain any extensive discussion of the applicable law, and so it is of limited use to students of
the Tribunal's jurisprudence

on the protection of cultural property.

The next case which raised the issue of cultural property, and which followed on the heels of
Plavsic, was that of Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Nartinovic, decided in March 2003.22 The two
defendants were convicted, under Article 3, Section D, for ordering the destruction of a mosque in
the village of Dosanj in Croatia. In entering the conviction, the Trial Chamber reiterated the
requirement, first announced in Blaskic, that, to be punishable as a violation of the laws or customs
of war, the institutions of religion or education which were damaged or destroyed must not have
been used for military purposes at the time at issue.23 What is most noteworthy about the judgment
in Naletilic and Nartinovic, however, is that it expressly rejected Blaskic'« requirement that the
institutions targeted need to be located outside of the immediate vicinity of military objectives.
Relying on Article 27 of the Hague Regulations, the Trial Chamber concluded instead that the mere
fact that a given institution is not in the immediate vicinity of military obj ective does not justify its

destruction."

23

Ibid., para. 31.
Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Nartinovic, IT -98-34- T, Judgement, 31 March 2003.
Ibid., para. 603.

24

Jbid., para. 604.

21

22
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The next decision, in the case of Milomir Stakic, was issued a few months later, in July
2003 _25The defendant was convicted for having played a leading role in the destruction or wilful
damage of 7 mosques and 2 catholic churches located in the city of Prijedor, in the central part of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in nearby villages. The Trial Chamber described these buildings as
both religious and cultural institutions.

Stakic was not charged under Article 3, Section D, so he

was convicted only for persecution as a crime against humanity.

The Trial Chamber's reasoning

followed closely that of Kordic and Cerkez, on which it relied. The Trial Chamber cited both the
case-law of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 1991 Report of the International Law Commission in
support of its conclusion that the destruction of religious buildings can amount to persecution as a
crime against humanity"

Quoting the decision in Kordic and Cerkez, the Trial Chamber stated

that "[t]his act, when perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory

intent, amounts to an attack on

the very religious identity of a people.,,27

The last decision, and the most recent one issued by our Tribunal, is perhaps the most
interesting of them all. This is the decision in the case ofMiodrag

Jokic, issued in March of this

year_28 This case is particularly significant to the issue of the protection of cultural property
because it concerned the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik in Croatia. The entire Old Town
was declared, in 1975, a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site. This declaration was made, of
course, pursuant to the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage.

The defendant pleaded guilty to the charge, made under Article 3, Section D of the

Statute, of having destroyed or wilfully damaged institutions dedicated to religious, charity,
education, and the arts in sciences, as well as historic monuments and works of art and science
located in Dubrovnik.

The indictment contained a detailed list of many historical buildings in the

Old Town which had either been destroyed or damaged.

25
26
27

28

Prosecutor
Ibid., para.
Ibid., para.
Prosecutor

Jokic was at the time commander of the

v. Stakic, IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003.
766.
767 (quoting Kordic and Cerkez, para. 207) (internal quotation marks omitted).
v. Jokic, IT-Ol-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 18 March 2004.
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Ninth Naval Sector of the Bosnian Serb Army, and, alongside others, he conducted the military
campaign aimed at Dubrovnik.

In particular, Jokic admitted that, on December 6th, 1991, the Yugoslavian forces under his
command fired hundreds of shells upon the Old Town of Dubrovnik as a part of their military
campaign.

Jokic also admitted that, at the time of these actions, he was aware of the protected

status that the Old Town enjoyed as a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site, and of the fact that a
number of buildings in the Old Town, as well as the Old Town's walls, were marked with the
symbols mandated by the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property.

In applying Section D of Article 3 to these circumstances,

the Trial Chamber noted that the

protection of cultural property reflected in that provision of our Statute had a long history in
international law. The Chamber emphasized, in particular, Articles 27 and 56 of the Hague
Regulations (annexed to the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land) and Article 5 of the 1907 Hague Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time ofWar_29 The Trial Chamber stressed, however-and
apt given the purpose of this symposium-that

this emphasis is particularly

it was the 1954 Convention for the Protection of

Cultural Property which strengthened the safeguards for cultural property in times of armed

conflict." In particular, the Trial Chamber explained that the Convention's

requirement of "general

protection" (as opposed to "special protection," accorded to heritage listed in the International
Register) imposed duties to safeguard and respect cultural property.

The Trial Chamber then turned to more recent international instruments concerned with
protection of cultural property.

The Chamber discussed the preamble to the 1972 UNESCO World

Heritage Convention, which provides that the "deterioration or disappearance

29

Ibid., para. 47.

30

Ibid., para. 48.
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of any item of the

cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment

of the heritage of all the nations of

the world.,,31 The 1972 Convention was of relevance because, as the Trial Chamber noted, the Old
Town of Dubrovnik was listed as a world heritage site.32 The Jokic Chamber also cited Article 53
of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and Article 16 of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. These articles, the Trial Chamber explained, reiterated the duty to protect
cultural property, and expanded the scope of the protection by outlawing "any acts of hostility
directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.,,33 The Trial Chamber also explained that, under the
Additional Protocols, direct attacks against protected heritage were prohibited irrespective of
whether they resulted in actual damage.i"

Turning to the facts of the case, the Trial Chamber emphasized that the entire Old Town of
Dubrovnik was considered, at the time at issue, "an especially important part of the world cultural
heritage.

It was, among other things, an outstanding architectural ensemble illustrating a significant

stage in human history.?" The Chamber therefore concluded that "[t]he shelling attack on the Old
Town was an attack not only against the history and heritage of the region, but also against the
cultural heritage of humankind.,,36 Notably, the Trial Chamber explained that the protection
accorded to Dubrovnik was not limited to individual buildings identified as having particular
historical value. Rather, the fact that the Old Town received protected status in its entirety reflected
the concern of the international community with the preservation of Dubrovnik as a living historical
and cultural artefact. As the Trial Chamber stated, "the Old Town was a 'living city' ... and the
existence of its population was intimately intertwined with its ancient heritage. Residential

Ibid., para. 49 (quoting the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added by the Jakie Trial Chamber).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., para. 5O.
34 Ibid. (citing JCRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, paras 2067, 2069-72).
35 Ibid., para. 51.
36 Ibid.

31
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buildings within the city also formed part of the World Cultural Heritage site, and were thus
protected.r "

Also of note is the Trial Chamber's apt reminder that the possibility of restoring the
damaged historical buildings does not mitigate the gravity of the conduct directed at their
destruction.

"Restoration

of buildings of this kind, when possible, can never return the buildings to

their state prior to the attack because a certain amount of original, historically authentic material
will have been destroyed, thus affecting the inherent value of the buildings.":"

In its conclusion, the Trial Chamber addressed the issue of what bearing Dubronvik's
as a specially protected world heritage site had on the criminality of the defendant's

status

conduct. The

Trial Chamber concluded that "since it is a serious violation of international humanitarian law to
attack civilian buildings, it is a crime of even greater seriousness to direct an attack on an especially
protected site, such as the Old Town, constituted of civilian buildings and resulting in extensive
destruction within the site.,,39 In addition, the Trial Chamber stressed that the extent of effected
destruction must be taken into account in assessing the gravity of the defendant's

criminal act. As

the Chamber explained, ''the attack on the Old Town was particularly destructive.

Damage was

caused to more than 100 buildings, including various segments of the Old Town's walls, ranging
from complete destruction to damage to non-structural parts.?"

For these two reasons, the Trial

Chamber concluded, "[t]he unlawful attack on the Old Town must therefore be viewed as especially
wrongful conduct.,,4l

The question which now arises is whether this jurisprudence,

which affords significant

protection to cultural property at the times of both international and internal armed conflict, will

39

Ibid., para. 5 L
Ibid., para. 52.
Ibid., para. 53.

40

Ibid.

37
38
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grow in the year to come, culminating in an authoritative and extensive body of law. It is in this
respect that I would like to mention the variety of indictments currently pending before the
Yugoslavia Tribunal which contain allegations of damage or destruction inflicted upon cultural
property.

Some of these cases are currently at trial, while others are only at a pre-trial stage.

Among these indictments, I would single out the case of Pavel Strugar, who is currently at trial,
who was one of the commanders of the Yugoslavian forces which attacked Dubrovnik.

The

indictment in this case charges destruction and damage of the historical buildings in the Old Town
ofDubrovnik.

It is possible, therefore, that the judgment which will result from this trial may

provide a more detailed factual and legal analysis of the attack against the Old Town than that
offered in the Jokic judgment, which was a result of a plea bargain. As to the other indictments,
there are some which charge offences against cultural property as both violations of laws and
customs of war under Article 3, Section D and persecution as a crime against humanity under
Article 5. These are the indictments against Radoslav Brdanin, Milan Martie and Pasko Ljubicic, as
well as the indictment against Siobodan Milosevic with respect to Croatia. The second group of
indictments charge these offences only as persecution as a crime against humanity.

These are the

indictments against Siobodan Milosevic with respect to Kosovo, and the indictments against Nikola
Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic and Momcilo Krajisnik.

Given the number of indictments which raise

the issue of the protection of cultural property, and given that fact that many of these indictments
contain detailed charges with respect to alleged offences against cultural property, I can say with
some confidence that there is a real potential for a development of a rich and sophisticated
jurisprudence

on this issue in our Tribunal.

In conclusion, I would like to observe that, most importantly, the case-law of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal with respect to the protection of cultural property shows that provisions in international
legal instruments designed to safeguard our historical and cultural heritage can be effectively

41

Ibid.
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enforced by the courts. The 1954 Convention, whose anniversary we commemorate today, is of
particular importance in this regard. It reaffirmed the importance of protecting cultural property in
wartime, and it considerably strengthened that protection.

The norms elaborated by the Convention

played an important role in several of the decisions which I described to you today, and I can
anticipate confidently that this trend will continue in the cases to come. By fmnly placing the
offences against cultural property not only among wrongs leading to state responsibility but also
among crimes punishable by international law as affecting the interests of the world community,
and by holding individuals responsible for them accountable, our Tribunal has made a significant
contribution to the protection of cultural property in armed conflicts.
issue has achieved in our jurisprudence

The prominence which this

should help to prevent the commission of these crimes in

the future.

In terms of the doctrinal contribution which our Tribunal has made to the international law
protecting cultural property during the times of military conflicts, I would single out the notion,
elaborated in several cases I have discussed, that the destruction of institutions dedicated to religion
or education can, if committed with the requisite discriminatory
crime against humanity.

intent, amount to persecution as a

(Of course, where this intent is absent, the destruction can still amount to a

war crime.) One may perhaps object to this crime against humanity approach on the ground that it
tends to diminish the importance of protecting cultural property per se, viewing attacks on this
property mainly as a form of a discriminatory attack directed against individuals.
however, that the characterization

I would argue,

of such attacks against cultural or religious institutions as crimes

against humanity is simply a recognition of the importance of these institutions to the identity and
the development of an individual.

Without the protection of our cultural or religious patrimony the

link with our heritage is severed, and with it is severed our ability to define our identity. By
protecting our cultural heritage, the 1954 Convention protects the autonomy of the individual and
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the diversity of humankind, and the jurisprudence

of our Tribunal has been faithful to these noble

ideals.

It deserves mentioning that under the Statute adopted by the Security Council, our Tribunal
has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity only if they were committed in the course of the
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia.Y
is a jurisdictional

As our Appeals Chamber has explained, however, this

limitation specific to our Tribunal, and not a requirement mandated by customary

intemational law.Y Crimes against humanity can be committed in times of peace as well as in
times of war. The doctrinal contribution that our Tribunal made to the law protecting cultural
property from wanton destruction, by characterizing this destruction as a crime against humanity
and not only as a war crime, can therefore be applied by other courts to criminalize the destruction
of cultural property in time of peace. This is particularly relevant in today's world where terrorist
and other attacks by non-governmental

armed groups are unfortunately common, and where the line

between armed conflicts and discriminatory

attacks against civilian population is often difficult to

draw. By viewing the destruction of cultural property as a crime directed against individuals, our
Tribunal has pointed to a potential new way of enhancing the reach and the thrust of the 1954
Convention.

See Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2
October 1995, para. 141.
43 Ibid.
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